• Irrational numbers: EASA strives to curb take-off data errors

    From Vincent Coen@2:250/1 to All on Fri Oct 23 15:01:50 2026
    If the recent finding that a LATAM Boeing 777-300ER crew made a 100t weight blunder in their take-off performance calculation sounds oddly familiar, it has
    echoes of at least two similar occurrences.

    The slip - the result of a mental stumble in basic arithmetic - was not double-checked, and the LATAM aircraft dragged its tail along the runway at Milan while labouring to become airborne, an event captured on surveillance cameras.

    It was reminiscent of a departure by another 777 - a freighter operated by Air France - from Paris Charles de Gaulle five years earlier, in 2019.

    The aircraft accelerated without sufficient thrust because the crew
    performance calculation used a departure weight which was 100t below the actual
    figure. Unlike the hapless LATAM pilots, the Air France crew managed to apply thrust in time to avoid shaving the underside fuselage skin off the jet.

    But 10 years prior to the Air France event, another 100t weight error caused an
    Emirates Airbus A340-500 to over-rotate and overrun at Melbourne.

    That all three events resulted in little more than dented aluminium and dented pride was fortuitous.

    The simplicity of the error belies the complexity of contributing factors and, ultimately, finding a solution. The aerospace industry has struggled to come up
    with a consistently reliable answer and the wait seems likely to be long.

    Italian investigators examined available studies on take-off performance calculations while analysing the LATAM occurrence.

    "While emphasising the importance of operating procedures, these studies highlight that the most effective barrier to countering the systemic risk associated with the human component can be found in the introduction of dedicated take-off performance monitoring and verification systems", the investigation authority ANSV states.

    The European Union Aviation Safety Agency formally proposed last year that such
    systems should be developed and introduced.

    But its mandate would only apply to new-build aircraft and not take effect until around 2033.

    Although ANSV acknowledges that the EASA proposal is a "significant" step towards addressing the situation, it highlights the absence of a retrofit requirement and a time horizon which lies almost a decade on from the LATAM tail-strike.

    "Impact of the proposal is limited in the short and medium term", it says, "as it excludes aircraft currently in service, [that is] those most exposed to the risk to be mitigated."




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